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Bicameral Mindscape
The Role of Consciousness in Memory. Brains, Minds & Media.
The Role of Consciousness in Memory Stan Franklin. Bernard J. Baars. Uma Ramamurthy. 1, Matthew Ventura.
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Bicameral Minds In Motion
Computer Science Department and the Institute for Intelligent Systems, The University of Memphis, USA2. The Neuroscience Institute, San Diego and the Institute for Intelligent Systems, The University of Memphis, USA3. Psychology Department and the Institute for Intelligent Systems, The University of Memphis, USA*Stan Franklin, Computer Science Department, Institute for Intelligent Systems, The University of Memphis, Memphis, TN 3. USA, Phone: (9. 01) 6. Fax: (9. 01) 6. 78- 2. Abstract. Conscious events interact with memory systems in learning, rehearsal and retrieval (Ebbinghaus 1. Tulving 1. 98. 5).
Here we present hypotheses that arise from the IDA computional model (Franklin, Kelemen and Mc. Cauley 1. 99. 8; Franklin 2. Baars 1. 98. 8, 2. Our primary tool for this exploration is a flexible cognitive cycle employed by the IDA computational model and hypothesized to be a basic element of human cognitive processing. Since cognitive cycles are hypothesized to occur five to ten times a second and include interaction between conscious contents and several of the memory systems, they provide the means for an exceptionally fine- grained analysis of various cognitive tasks.
We apply this tool to the small effect size of subliminal learning compared to supraliminal learning, to process dissociation, to implicit learning, to recognition vs. The IDA model elucidates the role of consciousness in the updating of perceptual memory, transient episodic memory, and procedural memory. In most cases, memory is hypothesized to interact with conscious events for its normal functioning.
The methodology of the paper is unusual in that the hypotheses and explanations presented are derived from an empirically based, but broad and qualitative computational model of human cognition. Keywords: Global Workspace, GWT, IDA, episodic memory, working memory, perceptual associative memory, procedural memory, availability heuristic, process dissociation, consciousness, cognition, model. In this paper we employ a theoretical methodology that is quite different from that which is currently standard in the experimental literature. Although the model is heavily based on experimental findings in cognitive psychology and brain science, there is only qualitative consistency with experiments. Rather, there are a large number of hypotheses derived from an unusual computational model of cognition, the IDA/GW model.
The model is unusual in two significant ways. First, it functionally integrates a particularly broad swath of cognitive faculties. Second, it does not predict numerical data from experiments, but rather, is implemented as a software agent, IDA, that performs a real- world personnel task for the US Navy. The IDA/GW model generates hypotheses about human cognition by way of its design, the mechanisms of its modules, their interaction, and its performance. All of these hypotheses are, in principle, testable.
With the advent of more sophisticated brain and behavioral assessment methods, some earlier hypotheses in this research program have been confirmed (Baars, 2. We expect the current set of hypotheses to become directly testable with continuing improvements in cognitive neuroscience.
Every agent must sample and act on its world through a sense- select- act (or stimulus, cognition, response) cycle. The IDA/GW model hypothesizes for us humans a complex cognitive cycle, involving perception, several memory systems, attention and action selection, that samples the world at five to ten times a second. This frequent sampling allows for an exceptionally fine grained analysis of common cognitive phenomena such as process dissociation, recognition vs.
At a high level of abstraction, these analyses, which are included in the paper, support the commonly held explanations of what is generally found in studies of the explicit (i. Tulving, 1. 98. 5; Baddeley et al, 2. At a finer grained level, however, our analyses flesh out these common explanations, adding detail and functional mechanisms. Therein lies the value of our analyses. In addition, this paper employs the word “consciousness” or “conscious cognition” to indicate a general cognitive function, much as the word “memory” has come to be used.
Conscious cognition is often labeled in many different ways in the empirical literature, including “explicit cognition,” “focal attention,” “awareness,” “strategic processing,” and the like. In the current approach we group all these specific terms under the umbrella of “conscious cognition,” as assessed by standard methods such as verifiable verbal report. GW Theory proposes a single underlying kind of information processing for conscious events, as implemented in the IDA model. Current techniques for studying these phenomena at a fine grained level, such as PET, f. MRI, EEG, implanted electrodes, etc., are still lacking either in scope, in spatial resolution, or in temporal resolution. PET and f. MRI have temporal resolution problems, EEG is well- known to have localizability difficulties, and implanted electrodes (in epileptic patients), while excellent in temporal and spatial resolution, can only sample a limited number of neurons; that is they are limited in scope.
As a result, many of our hypotheses, while testable in principle, seem difficult to test at the present time. When GW theory was first proposed, the core hypothesis of “global activation” or “global broadcasting” was not directly testable in human subjects. Since that time, however, with the advent of brain imaging, widespread brain activation due to conscious, but not unconscious, processes has been found in dozens of studies (see Baars, 2. Dehaene, 2. 00. 1). We expect further improvements to make our current hypotheses testable as well.
The IDA/GW model has unusual breadth, encompassing perception, working memory, declarative memory, attention, decision- making, procedural learning and more. This breadth may raise questions. How can such a broad model produce anything useful? The model suggests that superficially different aspects of human cognition are so highly integrated that they can’t be fully understood in a fragmentary manner. Watch Beulah online with subtitles in QHD 16:9. A more global view may provide an overview with surprising points of simplification.
Conscious cognition and memory: Basic facts to be accounted for Human memory seems to come in myriad forms: sensory, procedural, working, declarative, episodic, semantic, long- term memory, long- term working memory and perhaps others. How to make sense of all of this? And to add to the difficulty, these terms are used differently in different research traditions.
Psychologists tend to use these terms to refer inferentially to systems that appear to hold memory traces and to the underlying knowledge that constitutes their contents. To computer scientists and to neuroscientists, memory refers only to the physical (not inferred) storage device. Further, in many cognitive studies, consciousness is either taken for granted or labeled with its own set of synonyms such as explicit cognition, focal attention, and awareness. Yet the role of consciousness has concerned memory researchers since Ebbinghaus (1. Because the question of the role of conscious cognition in memory is so broad, we attempt to approach it in a qualitative way, rather than trying to make precise, quantitative, but local, predictions (Broadbent 1. Posner 1. 98. 2).
The following empirical methods have been used to dissociate conscious and unconscious aspects of learning, memory storage and retrieval. They must therefore be accounted for by an adequate theory of the role of conscious cognition in memory. Although subliminal acquisition of information appears to occur, the effect sizes are quite small compared to conscious learning. In a classic study, Standing (1. No intention to learn was needed. Consciously learned educational material has been recalled after 5.
Bahrick, 1. 98. 4). No effect sizes nearly as long- lasting as these have been reported in the subliminal learning literature (Greenwald et al, 1. Elliott & Dolan, 1. Conscious access greatly facilitates most types of learning. Process dissociation is one of the widely used techniques today to separate consciously- mediated and nonconscious components in memory retrieval (Jacoby 1.
In a typical example, subjects are asked to avoid reporting items that they have learned in a previous list (so- called exclusion instructions). Items that are nevertheless reported, in spite of the conscious aim of excluding them, are assumed to lack conscious access to the source of learning. The probabilities of inclusion and exclusion conditions can be determined, and the degree of unconscious source knowledge can be estimated, given certain assumptions.
In this fashion, conscious versus unconscious aspects of memorized lists can be dissociated. Implicit learning. In this set of paradigms subjects are always asked to attend to (and therefore become conscious of) a set of stimuli.
The organizing regularities among the attended stimuli – such as grammars that generated those stimuli – can be shown to be learned, even though people are not generally aware of them. Nevertheless, because the stimulus set is always conscious, conscious access appears to be a necessary condition, even for implicit learning of inferred rules and regularities. There is considerable evidence that people are conscious of retrieved memories in recall, but not necessarily in recognition tasks (e. Gardiner et al, 1. For pioneering memory researchers like Ebbinghaus, indeed, the term “recall” meant retrieval to consciousness.
The feeling of knowing that characterizes recognition is a “fringe conscious” phenomenon, that is, an event that has high accuracy but low reported conscious content (Baars, 2. In cognitive working memory, the active operations of input, rehearsal, recall and report are conscious (Baddeley 1.